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Loyola Consumer Law Reporter
on common carriers to exercise the
utmost care and diligence toward
patrons. However, common carriers do not act as insurers of their
passengers' safety and must only
exercise care consistent with the
practical operation of the carrier's
business.
Squaw Valley asserted four reasons why it was not responsible for
the heightened level of care. First,
Squaw Valley argued that it was
not a common carrier under the
state liability statute. Second, even
if Squaw Valley was a common
carrier, a California utilities statute exempted it from common
carrier status. This statute exempted ski lift operators from the definition of a common carrier for
regulation by the California Public
Utilities Commission. Third,
Squaw Valley asserted that it was
not liable because the carrier-passenger relationship had not commenced at the time of the accident.
Finally, Squaw Valley argued that
public policy dictates that chair lift
operators be exempt from common carrier status.
The trial court held that Squaw
Valley was a common carrier and
that the state utilities statute exempted ski lift operators from
common carrier status for public
utilities regulation purposes only.
Squaw Valley appealed this ruling
to the California Court of Appeals
for the Third District.
Common Carrier Status Applies
The California liability statute,
Civil Code section 2168, defines a
common carrier as any entity that
holds itself out to the public as
transporting goods or persons from
place to place for profit. The appellate court reasoned that Squaw
Valley fit this definition because it
offered the ski lift facilities to the
public for a fixed charge.
Squaw Valley, however, argued
that it did not offer its lift facilities
to the general public because use of
the lift was restricted to persons
who used the proper equipment
and who purported to have the
ability to ski. The court rejected
this argument, stating that an offering to the public does not mean an
offering to everyone at all times; an
enterprise need only be available to
the extent that members of the
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general public may use it if they
choose to. The Squaw Valley requirements were merely conditions required by the sport of skiing. Any person complying with
the necessities of the sport could
avail themselves of the service,
therefore, the court ruled that
Squaw Valley offered its facilities
to the public.

tance. Bowles paid for her lift
ticket and was attempting to board
the chair lift at the boarding area at
the time of injury. The court ruled
that the carrier-passenger relationship had commenced and therefore
held that the common carrier status applied to Squaw Valley.

No Exemption From Common
Carrier Status

Finally, Squaw Valley claimed
that public policy demands ski lift
facilities be exempted from common carriers status for tort liability
purposes. Boarding a moving ski
lift, Squaw Valley asserted, involves inherent risks that cannot
be eliminated. Ski lifts, therefore,
differ significantly from typical
common carriers such as taxicabs
or buses and holding ski lift operators to a higher standard of care
was impractical. The court, however, refused to consider the public
policy argument, holding that the
legislature, not the court, was the
proper forum for these considerations.
Scott R. Anderson

Squaw Valley argued that because ski lift operators are exempted from common carrier status
under the California utilities statute, they are also exempted from
common carrier status for purposes of tort liability. The appellate
court rejected this argument, stating that the legislature not only
enacted the utilities and liabilities
laws as part of distinctly different
statutory schemes but also for different purposes.
Prior to enactment of the utilities statute, the California Public
Utilities Commission rendered an
administrative opinion that ski lift
facilities were not common carriers
subject to its regulatory jurisdiction. The court found that the
legislature's purpose in enacting
the utilities statute was merely to
codify this decision and not to
further exempt ski lift operators
from common carrier status for
tort liability. If the legislature intended the further exemption it
would have directly amended or
referred to the liability statute.
Therefore, the court held that the
California utilities statute did not
exempt Squaw Valley from common carrier status for determining
tort liability.
Carrier-Passenger Relationship
Had Begun
Squaw Valley further argued
that common carrier status did not
apply because Bowles had not actually boarded the ski lift at the time
of the accident, and therefore, the
carrier-passenger relationship had
not yet commenced. The court
disagreed, stating that the carrierpassenger relationship commences
when a person goes to the place of
departure intending in good faith
to become a passenger and the
carrier takes some action in accep-

Public Policy Argument Fails

Texas Court of Appeals
Denies Summary
Judgment Due To
Temporary Suspension
of Statute of Limitations
In Misbranded Drug
Case
In Parker v. Yen and Revco Discount Drug Centers, Inc., 823 S.W.
2d 359 (Tex. App. Dallas 1991),
the Texas Court of Appeals for the
Fifth District held that summary
judgement could not be granted in
a case involving medical malpractice, negligence, and the Deceptive
Trade Practices Act while there
were genuine issues of fact as to the
statute of limitations and proximate cause.
Background
Charles A. Parker ("Parker")
sued on behalf of himself and Mrs.
Rosalie C. Parker, alleging that
Garry Robert Yen ("Yen"), a pharmacist employed by Revco Discount Drug Centers, Inc. ("Revco"), misfilled a prescription for
(continued on page 106)
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Sinequan on May 7, 1987. Instead,
Yen gave Mrs. Parker another
drug, Dalmane, a fast- acting sleeping aid used for the treatment of
insomnia. Parker further contended that, because she ingested Dalmane on May 9, 1987, Mrs. Parker
fell asleep while operating a car
and collided with another vehicle.
As a result of this accident, Mrs.
Parker suffered serious injuries
and is now an invalid requiring
continuous care.
On April 27, 1989, Parker sent
Yen and Revco notices of a health
care liability claim. On July 11,
1989, Parker sued Yen and Revco
asserting causes of action against
both based on negligence per se,
medical malpractice, and the Deceptive Trade Practices Act
("DTPA"), Tex. Bus. & Com.
Code Ann. §§ 17.01 etseq. (1991),
and against Revco only for common law negligence.
Both Yen and Revco moved for
summary judgement, arguing that
the two-year statute of limitations
barred the lawsuit. Revco also alleged that the Dalmane prescription did not proximately cause
Mrs. Parker's accident. Yen filed a
supplemental motion, contending
that a recovery against him was
prohibited because Texas only allows recovery if the injured party's
percentage of responsibility is less
than or equal to fifty percent. The
trial court granted summary judgement to both Yen and Revco.
Parker appealed, contending
that genuine issues of material fact
existed as to whether the statute of
limitations had expired, whether
proximate cause existed, and
whether the summary judgements
were granted upon claims not set
out in the motions. On appeal,
Parker was required by Texas law
to show that each of the independent arguments alleged in the summary judgement motions were insufficient to support the trial
court's order.
DTPA Discovery Rule Not
Negated
Parker's DTPA claim has a discovery rule that requires the individual seeking summary judgment,
here Yen and Revco, to prove as a

matter of law that the opposing
party, here the consumer, discovered or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered the occurrence of the false,
misleading, or deceptive act or
practice more than two years before suit was filed. Parker argued
that Yen and Revco failed to negate the DTPA discovery rule in
their motions for summary judgement. The appellate court found
that whether the Parkers knew or
should have known of the alleged
deceptive acts was material to
whether the DTPA claim was
barred by the limitations period,
and therefore, summary judgement was improper on this point.
Questions Exist as to Statute of
Limitations
Parker also alleged that the trial
court erred in holding that the
statute of limitations had run on
the medical malpractice and negligence claims. Parker claimed that
section 4.01 of the Medical Liability and Insurance Improvement Act
provides that if a written notice of
a claim of health care liability is
given, the applicable statute of
limitations tolls, or is temporarily
suspended, for a period of seventyfive days following the notice.
Parker gave the required notice to
Yen on April 27, 1989. The
seventy-five day tolling period
ended on July 12, 1989, and Parker
filed suit on July 11, 1989. The
appellate court agreed and held
that the limitations statute was
tolled on the medical malpractice
claim against Yen for seventy- five
days, due to Parker's written notice.
With respect to the claims of
common law negligence and negligence per se, Parker contended
that Mrs. Parker's disability tolled
the running of the limitations period. Revco argued that because the
wrongful conduct was separate in
time from the harm caused, the
Parkers' cause of action accrued
when the prescription was misfilled.
The appellate court concluded
that Yen's conduct gave the Parkers two causes of action, one for the
economic interest and one for
bodily injury. The economic interest protected, the right to seek a
properly filled prescription or the

return of their money, accrued at
the time the prescription was misfilled on May 7, 1987. Alternatively, the bodily injury claim arose
when Mrs. Parker ingested the Dalmane and drove a car under its
effects on May 9, 1987. Also, the
appellate court concluded that Yen
and Revco did not controvert Mrs.
Parker's proof as to mental disability. Thus, the court held that a
genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the statute of
limitations was tolled for the negligence causes of action when the
bodily injury occurred.
Proximate Cause Unclear
Yen contended that recovery
against him was prohibited because Texas only allows recovery if
the injured parties' percentage of
responsibility is less than or equal
to fifty percent. In the case at hand,
Yen argued that Mrs. Parker's negligence was greater than his because she had the last opportunity
to avoid taking the drug. Furthermore, she voluntarily drove a motor vehicle under the drug's effects.
The court held that there was no
evidence that Mrs. Parker knew
she was taking Dalmane rather
than Sinequan. She had no reason
to avoid the effect of the drug by
not taking it or driving under its
influence. Therefore, Yen had not
proven as a matter of law that Mrs.
Parker's percentage of responsibility was more than fifty percent.
Parker asserted that interrogatory questions regarding the drugs
Mrs. Parker took raised issues of
fact barring summary judgement.
Yen and Revco argued that no
evidence established that the misfilled prescription of Dalmane
proximately caused the accident.
The appellate court concluded that
the varying interpretation and answers to the interrogatories raised
fact issues barring summary judgement.
The appellate court reversed the
trial court's grant of summary
judgement with respect to Yen,
and affirmed the trial court's
awarding Revco summary judgement on the medical malpractice
claim. However, the court reversed
the summary judgement with respect to Revco for all other claims,
and remanded the case to the trial
court.
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